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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the Venezuelan government’s efforts to establish a 
“communal state” through the eyes of working-class chavista activists in the city of 
Valencia. It argues that the attempt to incorporate grassroots community 
organisations into a state-managed model of popular democracy produces a series 
of “utopian disjunctures” for the actors involved. These disjunctures, the article 
contends, stem from conflicting political temporalities within the chavista project, 
as long-term aspirations of radical democracy clash with more short-term demands 
to obtain state resources and consolidate the government’s power. The case 
highlights the tensions generated by efforts to reconcile radical democratic 
experiments with left-nationalist electoral politics.  
KEYWORDS 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolution, chavismo, communal state, anthropology of 
democracy, post-neoliberalism, utopia 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008, democracy has re-emerged as a central 
battleground in struggles over the shape of political and economic futures. Amid the 
social and economic fallout of the crisis in Europe and North America, novel 
experiments in direct democracy have been central to anti-austerity movements such 
as the 15M in Spain and the numerous manifestations of Occupy, which sought to 
reclaim public spaces and promote alternative democratic practices beyond the 
political mainstream (Juris 2012; Rasza and Kurnik 2012). As David Nugent (2012) 
observes, these mobilisations can be traced to the “twin crises of global capitalism and 
representative democracy” (2012: 281), and to a shared acknowledgement that liberal 
democracies, grounded as they are in the separation between political and economic 
spheres, preclude the possibility of a radical redistribution of wealth (2012: 282). Yet 
while such experiments in direct democracy have garnered much attention, they have 
not replaced more traditional political formations that continue to seek political power 
in order to enact social change. Indeed, in the case of the resurgent Latin American 
left in the 2000s, it was the incorporation of diverse social movements into electoral 
projects that brought radical democratic imaginaries to the fore (Burbach et al. 2013; 
Goodale and Postero 2013). But what happens to the demands for a more direct or 
participatory democracy when extra-parliamentary movements opt to make 
compromises with mainstream politics and pursue their goals through the ballot box 
as well as in the streets? What are the consequences for egalitarian political groupings 
that, for either strategic or ideological reasons, find themselves entangled in the 
machinations of electoral politics and state power?   
This article explores the experiences of a group of working-class activists in 
Venezuela who chose to align themselves with the left-nationalist government of 
Hugo Chávez, the former president who led a political movement often known as 
chavismo until his death in March 2013. My ethnographic focus centres on a state-led 
attempt to construct a socialist commune across a number of working-class barrios 
(shantytowns) in the south of Valencia, Venezuela’s third largest city.1 For fifteen 
months between 2008 and 2010, and a further period in 2012, I shadowed chavista 
activists as they involved themselves in new political vehicles being rolled out by the 
state. Through this case study, I argue that the attempt to incorporate existing 
community organisations into a state-managed model of popular democracy led to a 
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series of what I term “utopian disjunctures” for the actors involved. These 
disjunctures, I suggest, were born of a tension between radical aspirations to establish 
self-governing democratic institutions on the one hand, and more pragmatic 
imperatives to obtain state resources and consolidate the gains of the chavista 
electoral project on the other. Examining how rival chavista factions put forward 
conflicting proposals of the future commune, I argue that a disjuncture between two 
different political temporalities lay at the heart of a series of conflicts and dilemmas 
for local activists. By “political temporalities”, I mean the ways in which actions and 
decisions are conceptualised by actors in relation to what is perceived to be politically 
possible within particular imaginative timeframes. In what follows, I group these 
issues into three main areas that structure the article: (1) a tension between 
prefigurative and instrumentalist politics; (2) conflicts over the legitimacy of 
community leaders and democratic accountability; and (3) divided loyalties between 
local organisations and the national chavista project. 
To date, anthropologists working on democracy have broadly made two 
principal contributions. The first has been to challenge the assumption that what 
Nugent (2002, 2008) calls “normative democracy” – a particular strand of liberal 
democracy characterised by representative politics, competitive elections, universal 
suffrage and individual liberties – is necessarily the form that all democratic projects 
will eventually arrive at. Instead, anthropologists have demonstrated that the forms 
democracy can take are as diverse as people themselves (Apter 1987; Brown 2006; 
Gutmann 2002; Hickel 2015; Holston 2008; Lazar 2008; Michelutti 2007, 2008; Paley 
2001, 2008a; Spencer 1997), with numerous case studies showing that the 
understandings, expressions and practices that constitute different polities draw on 
“conceptual worlds that are often far removed from theories of liberal democracy” 
(Michelutti 2007: 641).  
A second strand of work has examined the explicit challenges to normative 
democracy among various anti-capitalist movements in recent years. While these 
movements are by no means uniform, there are several key traits that link the 
Zapatista uprising in Mexico to the alterglobalisation movement and Occupy. Chief 
among them are mobilisation against neoliberalism and corporate power, a disinterest 
in seizing control of the state, a preference for direct democracy and prefigurative 
politics over representation, and horizontal, network-based organisational structures 
(Albro 2006; Barmeyer 2009; Garces 2013; Graeber 2002, 2004, 2013, 2013; Hickel 
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2012; Juris 2012; Juris and Khasnabish 2013; Khasnabish 2004; Maeckelbergh 2012; 
Nash 1997; Razsa and Kurnik 2012). 
This article aims to build on these bodies of work by highlighting how 
conflicting political temporalities can produce highly disjunctive experiences for 
actors within radical democratic projects. In particular, it demonstrates that the 
entanglement between new participatory arms of the Venezuelan state and nascent 
experiments in popular democracy simultaneously enabled and impeded egalitarian 
aspirations, as local activists struggled to reconcile competing political imperatives 
that co-existed within the same movement. By exploring these trends, I seek to 
deepen our understanding of the challenges that egalitarian projects may encounter as 
they attempt to establish alternatives to capitalism and representative democracy in 
the coming years. 
 
 
Popular democracy and the Bolivarian Revolution 
 
The Venezuelan case is a pertinent one to compare with post-2008 social movements, 
since the rise of chavismo was born of similar discontents with neoliberalism and 
representative democracy. Like much of Latin America, Venezuela went into rapid 
social, economic and political decline following the sovereign debt crisis of the early 
1980s (Ellner and Hellinger 2003; Harvey 2006; Phillips 1998; Roberts 2003). During 
the era that followed, a huge contraction in social spending meant that by the mid-
1990s more than 60 percent of the population was living in poverty, including 36 
percent in extreme poverty (Organización Panamerica de Salud 1998; República de 
Venezuela 1995, both cited in Roberts 2003: 59). The incumbent political regime, a 
two-party duopoly that had governed since 1958, lost any remaining credibility when 
it violently suppressed a popular uprising against austerity measures in 1989 (Coronil 
and Skurski 1991; Lopez Maya 2003; McCoy and Myers 2004), resulting in hundreds 
and perhaps thousands of deaths.
2
  
Chávez, a radical army colonel who was jailed for leading an abortive coup in 
1992, was elected in 1998 after building a broad leftist coalition, the Fifth Republic 
Movement (Movimiento Quinta República, MVR), which drew strongly from existing 
traditions of neighbourhood organising in the country’s barrios (Ciccariello-Maher 
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2013a: 243-244), as well as on Chávez’s ties to the military. Historically, barrio 
community bodies have displayed a great diversity of strategic and ideological 
positions, ranging from close clientelist ties with political parties in the early years of 
settlement (Karst 1973; Peattie 1968; Ray 1969) to radical mobilisations around 
amenities and public services during the 1970s and 1980s (Ciccariello-Maher 2013a; 
Fernandes 2010; Velasco 2011). 
Chávez called his political movement the “Bolivarian Revolution”, adopting 
Simón Bolívar, Latin America’s foremost republican hero, as his central icon. In the 
early years of his presidency, his principal focus was on the reduction of poverty and 
inequality. After reasserting control over the state oil company, PDVSA, the 
government launched a series of petro-funded social missions (misiones sociales) 
providing subsidised food, local healthcare and free education to millions of 
previously excluded Venezuelans (Ellner 2008; Wilpert 2007). These measures 
helped to solidify the government’s support among the country’s poor, and Chávez 
embarked on a more radical set of reforms after rebranding his project as “twenty-first 
century socialism” at the World Social Forum in 2005 (Coronil 2011). 
A central pillar of the Chávez’s second phase in office was the drive to reform 
and rejuvenate Venezuelan democracy. After laying the groundwork for a new form 
of “protagonist and participatory democracy” in the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution 
(Alvarez 2003), the government faced substantial opposition from municipal 
authorities during initial attempts to stimulate public involvement in governance (see 
Wilpert 2007: 56-60 and García-Guadilla 2008: 6). As a result, subsequent efforts 
have channelled funding to local bodies via centralised ministries rather than through 
local municipalities, thereby allowing the government to circumvent uncooperative 
elements within the existing municipal bureaucracy by simultaneously strengthening 
the central executive and devolving power to local citizen-led organs. In line with this 
approach, in 2006 the government passed a law giving citizens the right to form 
neighbourhood-level communal councils (consejos comunales, CCs) in their 
localities. Drawing on the traditions of barrio assemblies and neighbourhood 
associations, the CCs are formed of elected voluntary spokespeople (voceras or 
voceros) who manage state-funded community development projects in areas such as 
health, water, food, land and education. By 2010, over 20,000 CCs had been formed 
in Venezuela (Ellner 2010: 67), with an estimated $1 billion being transferred directly 
to them in the first year of their launch (López Maya and Lander 2011: 74).
3
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In an effort to build on these achievements, in 2008 the government began 
encouraging CCs in adjacent communities to group together and form communes 
covering much wider territories. Amid much fanfare and public promotion, Chávez 
proposed that these larger organs could go on to become new structures of popular 
governance at the local level, eventually supplanting the country’s existing system of 
local municipalities with a “communal state” (estado comunal).4 Though the president 
stressed that the communes must be constructed by citizens “from below” (desde 
abajo), a Ministry for Communes and Social Protection (MPComunas) was launched 
in 2008 to aid the construction process. By proposing to “transfer” the “constituted 
power” of the state to the “constituent power” of the people (Harnecker 2008), the 
communal state is envisioned as a dialectical site of struggle, in which radical 
elements within the existing state open up new spaces for local-level self-government, 
offering the general population the opportunity to eventually supplant the bourgeois 
state with their own structures (Azzellini 2010, 2013; Ciccariello-Maher 2013b). 
 
 
Piloting the commune  
 
In January 2008, a group of community organisers from a barrio known as El 
Camoruco returned from a conference in Caracas with the exciting news that their 
community had been chosen to sit at the centre of Venezuela’s first urban commune.5 
As influential community leaders in their locality, the group had been invited to the 
conference with the aim of launching a series of pilot communes across the country. 
Chávez had promised that the government would provide funding for development 
projects once the communities themselves had established the political structures 
necessary to receive this funding. El Camoruco, a community of approximately 4,000 
residents, was well-placed to launch the commune in Valencia. It was one of the 
better connected barrios in Miguel Peña – a predominantly poor urban parish of 
around 500,000 people – and had been one of chavismo’s electoral strongholds in the 
city for the past decade. 
For Rafael, Rosa and Oneidys, three chavista activists with a long history of 
community organising in Valencia’s poor southern zones, the pilot commune seemed 
the perfect opportunity to establish lasting structures of popular governance. Rafael 
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and Rosa, two firm friends who were at the heart of chavista politics in the area, had 
cut their teeth in El Camoruco’s neighbourhood association (asociación de vecinos, 
AV) during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The two of them had been integral to the 
transformation of the AV into a combative and collectively active body that put major 
pressure on the municipality through large community mobilisations. Between 1999 
and 2003, newly asphalted roads, streetlights, telephone lines and a community health 
scheme had all arrived after a series of large rallies and demonstrations forced the 
municipality into action.  
Eager to build on their achievements in El Camoruco, Rafael, Rosa and other 
key figures from the AV had gone on to form a grassroots network known as the 
Association for the Promotion of Endogenous Community Development 
(ASOPRODENCO), which incorporated several younger activists, including Oneidys. 
Based on the voluntary commitment of around 40 community leaders, 
ASOPRODENCO’s principal aim was to establish participatory community 
organisations like El Camoruco’s in other neighbourhoods. The organisation received 
no state funding, and much of its work centred on the facilitation of new AVs and, 
when they were launched in 2006, communal councils (CCs). When a community 
showed an interest in establishing a CC, ASOPRODENCO would send several 
members to offer training on how to conduct the process, which could take up to a 
year to complete.  
Often, ASOPRODENCO’s work as community facilitators took place in the 
squatter settlements of wooden and tin ranchos known as invasiones (invasions) that 
had begun appearing throughout the south of Valencia in the Chávez era. A typical 
day early on in my fieldwork would involve driving out in Rafael’s battered 4x4 to a 
new settlement on the fringes of Valencia’s industrial sprawl. There, he, Rosa and 
Oneidys would engage the community in a question and answer session concerning 
the importance of community organising and the meaning of terms like popular 
power. Part of this would involve discussions of logistical practicalities, during which 
Rafael would outline how to organise a promotional team, how to arrange a public 
assembly and how to elect street wardens. But much more of ASOPRODENCO’s 
focus was on providing ideological and moral guidance that, they believed, had to 
prefigure any attempt to become a community body. “What makes a community?” 
Rosa would ask those assembled, before delivering a well-rehearsed speech: 
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This is about building a new relationship with the state, and about you becoming the 
government in your locality. But before we talk about structures and funding, the 
most important thing is your formation as a community, your spiritual values. What 
you have here is the beginnings of a community, a chance to be unified and together 
in a union. You can be the founders of the history of your community.  
 
Generally, Rafael would follow Rosa’s introduction with a line that he would repeat 
over and over again: “The most important thing is the participation of the people.”  
In emphasising these points, ASOPRODENCO sought to engender the kind of 
communitarian sociality and moral personhood that is common to the practice of 
“prefigurative politics”. First coined by Wini Breines (1980), prefigurative politics 
rests on the idea that a new society can only be realised by creating non-capitalist and 
non-hierarchical relationships “prior to and in the process of revolution” (1980: 421). 
As David Graeber observes, the key to this approach is the belief that “the form of our 
action should itself offer a model, or at the very least a glimpse of how free people 
might organize themselves, and therefore what a free society might be like” (2013: 
233; see also Maeckelbergh 2011). For ASOPRODENCO, the importance of 
promoting these principles was not only an effort to create collectivities that could 
make successful demands on the state, but also a desire to instill a political and moral 
consciousness that would come to create participatory democracy as a lived reality. 
As Oneidys put it, “To me, the la conciencia [consciousness] is the most important 
thing and it has to go hand in hand with infrastructural developments.”  
 When ASOPRODENCO were offered the opportunity to promote and manage 
the pilot commune, they sought to apply these same principles to its construction. 
Throughout 2008 a series of public assemblies were arranged, with Rafael, Rosa and 
Oneidys forming part of a promotional committee that set out to galvanise local 
interest in the project. On the back of the now established CCs, the early response was 
positive, with good attendance at the assemblies and a diverse representation of 
communities present in the planning stages. Particularly encouraging for Rafael and 
Rosa was the involvement of a number of chavista spokespeople from CCs based in 
the private middle-class developments known as urbanicaziones that bordered El 
Camuruco. Many of these individuals had never been involved with barrio activists 
before, and their participation presented an opportunity to bridge some of the tensions 
that existed between urbanizaciones and barrios and move away from the stark social 
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and political polarisation that became increasingly pervasive in the Chávez era.
6
 By 
early 2009 some 22 CCs in the zone surrounding El Camoruco had provisionally 
signed up to the commune, with plans to incorporate a further 18 communities also 
underway.
7
 In total, it was thought the commune could cover a population of up to 
70,000 people. 
 Yet as ASOPRODENCO set about what they believed to be the early stages of 
commune construction, another chavista institution, the Sala de Batalla Social 
(“Social Battle Centre”), was established in El Camoruco, complete with a small 
concrete office erected next to the community’s sports court. Funded directly by 
MPComunas, the Sala was headed by Norma, an employee of a state-funded 
revolutionary organisation called the Frente Francisco de Miranda (FFM), whose 
members receive specialist training in Cuba before providing practical and ideological 
support to the local-level bases of chavismo. Much like the role that 
ASOPRODENCO had been performing independently, the Sala was introduced to the 
area with the specific aim of facilitating commune construction in line with the 
MPComunas model. 
 ASOPRODENCO’s response to the arrival of the Sala and the FFM was 
lukewarm to say the least. No official communications from either Norma or 
MPComunas had been made when it was first established, and there was both 
confusion and resentment that local leaders with a long history of organising were 
effectively being overlooked by the new arrivals. The arrival of the Sala represented 
the “official” state model, which ASOPRODENCO had unwittingly pre-empted 
thanks to their connections in Caracas. The presence of two steering teams, one born 
from the locality and the other from the MPComunas, meant that there were 
effectively two groups seeking to act as the organising body for a commune that did 
not yet exist.   
 
 
Prefigurative versus instrumentalist politics 
 
By mid-2009 Miguel Peña’s would-be commune was a highly complicated picture. 
ASOPRODENCO, with their history of community organising and established local 
networks, felt they had legitimate claims on the stewardship of the initiative. But 
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since the Sala was part of the government’s official framework, an increasing number 
of spokespeople from local CCs felt that it should be the body responsible for 
coordinating the commune’s construction. It was also the case that, although 
ASOPRODENCO was a well-respected organisation in the area, a number of 
prominent chavista figures resented the influence that Rafael in particular exerted 
over local politics. By providing an alternative source of political authority, the Sala 
were able to capitalise on these rivalries and establish a network of spokespeople who 
were keen to challenge ASOPRODENCO. As the Sala began to gather more 
supporters, one group of CC spokespeople formally broke off from 
ASOPRODENCO’s proposal and began to associate themselves with Norma, 
effectively forming a rival faction. As the weeks wore on, it became clear that the 
Sala were actually proposing their own commune in opposition to 
ASOPRODENCO’s plan. Since neither proposal could move forward without 
agreement from all the CCs, the two factions found themselves engaged in a contest 
to win the support of local community organisers. 
 Although both groups expressed a firm loyalty to the revolution and to the 
principles of popular power, ASOPRODENCO’s commitment to prefigurative 
politics was one of the major points of contention between the two groups. Because 
they reasoned that the size of the commune should be decided by the communities 
themselves, they refused to place limits on which CC spokespeople could attend 
meetings or be part of the project. In response, the faction aligned to the Sala argued 
that because of the great social and political differences between the middle-class 
urbanizaciones and working-class barrios, the commune should only be comprised of 
poorer communities. At a public assembly held to discuss their differences, Norma 
put forward the Sala’s view: “those [middle-class] communities don’t have the same 
material needs as these barrios. They have everything [material] resolved already, so 
what’s the point in having them in the commune? We need to focus on ourselves.” 
Her comment made the Sala’s position clear: their main focus was on obtaining state 
resources in order to make infrastructural improvements to the barrios.  
This was a huge point of contention for ASOPRODENCO, who were 
immensely proud of the fact that they had crossed social divides and built a network 
of diverse individuals and communities. Rafael firmly defended their policy of 
inclusion. He reminded people that middle-class residents from Los Mangos – an 
urbanización that bordered El Camoruco – used to be afraid to cross into the barrio, 
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whereas now these same people were working as community leaders alongside barrio 
activists. In an impassioned response, he spoke of a broader vision of cross-class unity 
and emphasised the need to tackle the endemic social and political polarisation in 
Venezuelan society. “To me, the strongest element in our proposal is our integration 
of different communities,” he said. “This is about human sensitivity to others, no 
matter where you’re living – Chávez always says this. This commune is for everyone. 
It’s not about how much you have, but about your participation.”  
But this call for political and social inclusivity was firmly rejected by the Sala. 
Norma reminded those present of the material changes the Chávez government had 
delivered to barrio residents, and warned that further prevarication over projects like 
the commune would endanger the revolution itself. “If we want this revolution to 
continue, we have to dar la respuesta [give the response or meet the needs] right 
now,” she said. This refusal to cede ground on the question of middle-class inclusion 
seemed to be premised less on local issues, and much more on the survival of the 
chavista electoral project at the national level. As various scholars have documented 
(Ellner and Hellinger 2003; Ellner 2008; Samet 2013; Spanakos 2008), Venezuela 
became steadily more polarised between supporters and opponents of the government 
throughout the 2000s, with flashpoints occurring during a brief coup against Chávez 
in 2002 and an opposition-led recall referendum in 2004. These tensions arose again 
in 2008 when government supporters voted to lift the constitutional limit on 
presidential terms, and there were genuine fears among local chavistas that the 
opposition was gaining ground on the government. By presenting their proposal as a 
cornerstone of the overarching chavista project, the Sala could play on these fears and 
portray themselves as a means for residents to safeguard the material gains they had 
already won. In contrast to ASOPRODENCO’s long-term and open-ended conception 
of the commune, theirs was a much more short-term and instrumentalist approach that 
ran in tandem with the national electoral strategy of securing working-class support.  
In the view of ASOPRODENCO’s activists, however, the Sala’s search for 
state funding had blinded them to a more far-reaching vision of self-government that 
focused on the making of new political and moral persons as its first principle. Time 
and time again, ASOPRODENCO activists would return to the question of 
consciousness, arguing that the Sala’s refusal to cooperate with their proposal 
revealed the persistence of capitalist values in their opponents. Oneidys typified this 
view:   
12 
 
 
I’m worried that [the Sala] are trying to keep the power for themselves, not 
necessarily because they’re corrupt but because they don’t understand popular 
power… It isn’t us [the community leaders] who decide what happens, it’s the 
people… I’ve never trusted the institutions because these things always come from 
above and it’s always about power.  
 
Much like their emphasis on prefigurative politics, this position privileged the process 
itself as critical to the political form. As Graeber (2004) observes, such principles of 
democratic consensus are “typical of societies where there would be no way to 
compel a minority to agree with a majority decision – either because there is no state 
with a monopoly of coercive force, or because the state has nothing to do with local 
decision-making” (2004: 89). Yet critics of consensus contend that it is unsuitable for 
large groupings, highly inefficient and open to manipulation.
8
 In his analysis of 
Occupy London, for example, Jason Hickel (2012) argues that a dogmatic reliance on 
consensus rested on a problematic liberal ethic that, in its desire to promote 
inclusiveness, openness and tolerance, undermined the dynamic of antagonism that is 
often central to the formulation of political claims (2012: 6). This was precisely the 
criticism that ASOPRODENCO faced from the Sala, who regarded their open-ended 
approach as time-consuming, inefficient and politically naïve. As one CC 
spokesperson remarked after another long meeting, “a lot of people are tired of all 
these meetings where nothing happens. Come on, let’s get moving and do 
something!” 
As such, differing conceptions of how community organisations should relate 
to “the people” – and indeed how this people itself was imagined – were central to the 
emergence of this intra-chavista factionalism. While the Sala envisioned the 
commune chiefly as a conduit for the distribution of state resources – implying a 
model of service delivery for the people – ASOPRODENCO viewed it as a project 
that would work on the people in political and moral terms. The key distinction was 
between one political imaginary that viewed “the people” as an electoral base 
requiring maintenance, and another that prioritised the subjective and relational 
transformation of that same “people” as a project in itself. Overall, since the 
conflicting political temporalities that underpinned these rival chavista factions were 
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forced to cohabit the same space, the presence of each necessarily prevented the other 
from realising its aims.  
 
 
The state, leadership and political rivalry  
 
Discussions about the relationship between the grassroots bases of chavismo and the 
state have been a constant during the movement’s political ascendancy (Denis 2011; 
Ellner 2013; Spronk et al. 2011). While some view the establishment of new state-
managed channels of political participation as a sign of grassroots social movements 
successfully pulling the state in a more radical direction (Azzellini 2010, 2013; 
Ciccariello-Maher 2013a, 2013b), others warn that increasing centralisation will 
inhibit the autonomy and vibrancy of community organisations (García-Guadilla 
2008; García-Guadilla 2011; Smilde 2009; Uzcátegui 2010). These debates about the 
role of the state have a particular quality in Venezuela, where the oil-rich “magical 
state” (Coronil 1997) has often struggled to deliver on its promise to provide 
prosperity for the majority of the population. Indeed, as Naomi Schiller (2013) points 
out, while oil wealth appears to imbue the state with a potent power “beyond the reach 
of human agency” (2013: 543), it often appears in incoherent, mundane or violent 
ways in everyday life (see also Abrams 1988; Das and Poole 2004; Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002; Fuller and Bénéï 2001; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Navaro-Yashin 
2002). 
 For the would-be comuneros in Miguel Peña, it was precisely the diverse and 
conflicting ways in which the state could appear that produced a second disjuncture 
around questions of leadership and democratic accountability. This particular issue 
was exemplified by a long-running dispute between Rafael and Ernesto, a recently 
elected CC spokesperson from El Camoruco who had aligned himself with the Sala 
faction and become a central figure in the power struggle between the two groups.   
A few days after the assembly, I spoke to Ernesto in the hope of finding out 
more about his opposition to Rafael and ASOPRODENCO. Although acknowledging 
his counterpart’s historic contribution to the community, Ernesto argued that Rafael 
had no legal right to coordinate the commune, whereas spokespeople from the CCs 
like himself had been elected to constitutionally sanctioned bodies. “A communal 
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council is something concrete, something official with laws,” he told me. “What is 
their commune? How big should it be? We still don’t know.” Because he had been 
elected to a state-sanctioned organ, Ernesto claimed that it was “the laws” – that is, 
the legal conference of legitimacy the state had given to the CCs – that gave 
spokespeople such as him the right to manage any proposed commune.  
Yet while he invoked law and officialdom to advocate for the Sala’s claims on 
the commune, Ernesto also raised concerns about what he regarded as self-interested 
careerism on Rafael’s part. Although Rafael’s contact with government officials had 
been the original starting point for the commune, Ernesto queried his underlying 
intentions: 
 
You need to open your eyes. Rafael has been put forward to be a councillor, he’s got 
the connections in Caracas. He’s a politico [politician]. Now there’s nothing wrong 
with politicos, we need them to help our communities. But the danger with politicos 
is that they can become politiqueros [political schemers]. I mean, all he does is talk, 
talk, talk without doing anything.  
 
These criticisms of Rafael were undoubtedly personal as well as political. Ernesto was 
an individual who had long been in Rafael’s shadow in the local chavista milieu, and 
the emergence of the Sala gave him access to an alternative source of authority that he 
could use to challenge his rival. As Sian Lazar (2008) notes, accusations of corruption 
and self-interest can be used to “highlight the moral integrity of the accuser, as well as 
throw some mud (not always undeserved) at the accused” (2008: 76). In this instance, 
by mentioning Rafael’s “connections” in Caracas, Ernesto could present his own 
faction as an embattled bastion of the authentic chavista bases struggling against the 
Machiavellian manoeuvrings of a politiquero. The insinuation that 
ASOPRODENCO’s proposal was merely a vehicle for Rafael’s personal ambitions 
allowed Ernesto to style himself as a more trustworthy political leader. Thus, while 
the state could be invoked as a necessary source of accountability for community 
leaders and organisations on the one hand, it could also be portrayed as a potential 
source of malevolent or corrupting forces on the other. Selectively, Ernesto presented 
two different manifestations of the same state: a legal and infrastructural state that 
assured accountability and gave him authority, versus a self-interested and 
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clientelistic state – embodied in this instance by Rafael and his “connections” – that 
threatened to undermine the power of new community leaders.  
 These wranglings over leadership and accountability demonstrated that, far 
from creating a singular model of popular democracy, the move towards state-
managed community organisations was multiplying and fragmenting the sources of 
authority that local leaders could call on to strengthen their positions, as new political 
institutions began to compete and overlap with older ones in a “duplication of 
bureaucracies” (Ellner 2008: 135). In their different ways, both Rafael’s long-standing 
informal authority and the more formalised power of elected CC spokespeople like 
Ernesto had been won through popular mandates. But since one group had to defeat 
the other in order for the commune to go ahead, these differing configurations of 
political power inevitably led to conflicts over who possessed the right to define 
nascent democratic institutions in the locality. They also gave aspiring political 
leaders new tools with which to chip away at the authority of their rivals.     
 
 
The problem of loyalty 
 
Given that the Venezuelan state can appear as both paternal and malevolent to barrio 
residents, the discursive and symbolic role played by Chávez has been central to the 
Bolivarian project retaining the view that it is a popular movement. The late president 
created a powerful emotive tie with supporters that gave grassroots activists a sense of 
popular ownership over government initiatives – indeed, the project of popular power 
can itself be understood as reformulation of the “magic performances” (Coronil 1997: 
389) long practised by the petro-state. But for chavistas, Chávez was also regarded as 
an exception to the usual “dirty river” (Harriss 2005) of politics, and for many was 
considered to be a moral exemplar – an earthy champion of el pueblo who was guided 
by a search for social justice and prepared to take on the establishment from the inside 
(Michelutti 2013; Zúquete 2008). Chávez’s great feat was thus in becoming the 
“master-signifier” (Žižek 1989: 93) of a political movement at the same time as being 
head of the “magical state” (see Coronil 1997).  
 Yet while this symbolic role proved effective at winning elections and 
maintaining popular support, it produced a further disjuncture for local-level chavista 
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activists, who found themselves torn between showing loyalty to the president – and 
therefore to his policies – and articulating their own views of how the revolution 
should take shape. Midway through 2010, after over a year of arguments, backbiting 
and several unsuccessful attempts at dialogue, Rafael announced that he would no 
longer be involved in the commune project. Because of his key position as one of 
ASOPRODENCO’s leaders, this decision effectively handed control of the commune 
project to the Sala. Those ASOPRODENCO activists who chose to stay on faced the 
prospect of participating in a different model of the commune from the one they had 
envisioned. Several of their members, including Rosa, chose to join Rafael in 
disassociating from the project as a whole. 
To my surprise, one of those who chose to remain with the Sala at the helm 
was Oneidys, who had always been one of their strongest critics within 
ASOPRODENCO. Most surprising of all was the explanation she gave for her 
decision. “It’s to do with the lineamiento [guidelines or regulations],” she told me. 
“It’s the Salas who are supposed to be managing the construction of the communes, 
and that comes directly from Chávez. That’s how the lines go [my emphasis].” 
Having always maintained a suspicion of the involvement of state bodies in local 
affairs, Oneidys was now versing the same arguments about officialdom that 
ASOPRODENCO had fought for so long. She even referred to governmental 
regulations – lineamiento – and a hierarchical chain of command in justification of 
her decision.  
Yet while this shift might seem contradictory given Oneidys’s previous 
position, it is worth considering the insights of Miriam Shakow (2011), who observes 
that in practice political actors often combine actions and ideals that they declare to be 
distinct in theory (2011: 316). Although those who self-identify as revolutionaries 
seek a transcendent politics, they are invariably met with an inability to unshackle 
their projects from the historical and material exigencies in which they are situated. 
They are forced to make compromises that contradict their visions, shifting their 
conceptual frameworks retrospectively as new imperatives channel their practice in 
particular directions. In the case of Oneidys, while she strove for a far-reaching vision 
of a self-governing commune built desde abajo (from below), in the end she seemed 
willing to accept a more contingent reality and work with a situation that fell some 
way short of her ideals. She was evidently torn between the radical, prefigurative 
form of democracy advocated by ASOPRODENCO and her broader loyalty to 
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Chávez and the revolution, which ultimately entailed working with the Sala and their 
more instrumental, short-termist approach. As Shakow points out, the recent re-
emergence of revolutionary aspirations in Latin America has not erased pragmatic 
calculations among political actors. Instead, these aspirations have “added to, rather 
than replaced” (2011: 317) more pragmatic approaches that accept contingent 
alliances when necessary.  
Seen in this light, Oneidys’s eventual acquiescence to the Sala’s proposal 
underlines the point that participation in Bolivarian initiatives such as the commune is 
often highly confused and disjunctive. In this instance, while grassroots chavistas 
were encouraged to be the principal protagonists in the construction of a new popular 
democracy, they were also under tacit pressure to comply with state-led objectives in 
ways that consolidated the power of the government and its electoral project. As a 
result, the actors involved found themselves in the disorientating position of having 
their utopian aspirations simultaneously nurtured and corralled by the chavista state. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the final paper published before his death, Fernando Coronil (2011) considered a 
strange paradox among the contemporary Latin American left. Although in recent 
years there has been, he wrote, “a proliferation of political activities inspired by 
socialist or communitarian ideals,” there is also a “pervasive uncertainty with respect 
to the specific form of the ideal future” (2011: 234). Contemporary political actors, he 
suggested, are thus caught between an “agitated present” and a “spectral future”, in 
which  
 
the future appears phantasmatic, as if it were a space inhabited by ghosts from the 
past and ideal dreams, and the present unfolds as a dense field of nervous agitation, 
constantly entangled in multiplying constraints, a conglomeration of contradictory 
tendencies and actions leading to no clear destination (2011: 247).  
    
The ethnographic material presented in this article sheds further light on the 
predicament described by Coronil as it appears in the Venezuelan context. In 
particular, it shows that this disjunctive relationship between the future and the 
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present stems from the contradictory ways in which the chavista electoral project both 
rhetorically promotes democratic experiments and institutionally reshapes them into 
formations that meets its own ends. In the case of the would-be commune, grassroots 
actors were subjected to imperatives that came from outside their communities and 
encouraged to participate in institutional channels that were not of their making, 
meaning they became caught between differing political timeframes and imaginative 
horizons. Since some individuals were more willing than others to embrace the 
demands that came with the communal state model, conflicts inevitably emerged as 
activists attempted to reconcile distinct democratic ideals with their communities’ 
pressing material needs. 
 Thus, while I share Schiller’s (2013) view that the Chávez era has enabled 
previously excluded sectors of the population to approach the state as an “unfolding 
project” (2013: 543) in which they can play a central role, I also contend that the 
Venezuelan government’s new vehicles for political participation are highly 
constraining – both structurally and imaginatively – for grassroots community 
organisations.
9
 For the actors involved in projects such as the commune, the political 
imaginary produced by these contradictory forces is one characterised by disjuncture 
and frustration as much as by hope and aspiration. The everyday experience of the 
Bolivarian Revolution is one intimately shaped by the tense co-existence between 
possibility and futility, motion and inertia.     
In a wider sense, the Venezuelan case provides valuable insights into 
anthropological concerns with the varied ways in which democratic aspirations can 
take form. While it is now well established that democracy has hugely diverse origins 
and expressions, the evidence presented here suggests that attempts to bring together 
contrasting democratic formations can result in a mismatch between different political 
temporalities. The incorporation of experimental popular democracies into 
hierarchical electoral projects puts particular pressures on the former, who must weigh 
the acquisition of much-needed resources against the imposition of institutional 
structures and timeframes that may contradict – or least complicate – their political 
ideals. Put simply, direct or participatory democracies that aim to eventually 
supersede representative politics are ultimately incommensurable with the demands of 
electoralism, and in the long run something is likely to give. Yet while there is a 
strong argument that groups who aim to pursue more radical forms of democracy 
should therefore seek greater autonomy (Paley 2008b), in situations where the state 
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monopolises resources, there is an equally strong case that historically excluded 
communities should make such contingent alliances in order to reap the material, 
social and symbolic benefits that they can provide.  
If Wolfgang Streeck (2014) is right to claim that democratic capitalism’s 
current crisis is not cyclical but secular – “a continuous process of gradual decay, 
protracted but apparently all the more inexorable” (2014: 38) – then it is likely that 
the extra-parliamentary movements that have emerged since 2008 in Europe and 
North America will encounter similar dilemmas should they choose to form coalitions 
with a re-emergent electoral left. Given that democracy, in all of its normative and 
vernacular guises, looks set to be a central battleground in struggles over the shape of 
the future, further critical attention to the relationship between the political and the 
temporal may be essential to our understanding of the possibilities that lie before us. 
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1
 Although the term barrio means “neighbourhood”, in Venezuela the word is used to refer to the low-
income, self-built communities that comprise a large part of the country’s cities. 
2
 Official records cite 277 deaths, but unofficial estimates – and what is held in popular memory – 
range into the thousands (Coronil and Skurski 1991: 311). 
3
 See Wilde (Forthcoming) for a more detailed analysis of the CCs.  
4
 Central to these plans was the proposed development of “socially productive enterprises” (empresas 
de producción social, EPSs), which were designed to give communal territories the capacity to employ 
local people and generate economic resources from within their own communities (Añez et al. 2011; 
Purcell 2013). 
5
 Other than high profile political figures, all names of communities and individuals in this article have 
been changed.  
6
 Although divides along lines of class had long existed in Venezuela, these became notably more 
politicised in the Chávez era, with the country becoming highly polarised around election times in 
particular. While there is a danger in oversimplifying people’s political affiliations, in general middle-
25 
 
                                                                                                                                            
class Venezuelans are more likely to support the political opposition, while poorer citizens are more 
likely to support the government (see Ellner and Hellinger 2003; Spanakos 2008).  
7
 These communities were those that were yet to sign up to the proposal or those who were still in the 
early stages of establishing their own CCs. 
8
 Harry Walker (2012), for example, suggests that in Amazonia, decisions that may appear to be taken 
by consensus are in actual fact constructed through covert alliances cultivated over long periods of 
time. The “consensus” on display in public meetings, he suggests, is often a public spectacle designed 
to ensure social harmony rather than a genuine process of decision-making. In Rasza and Kurnik’s 
(2012) study of Occupy in Slovenia, meanwhile, participants favoured small-scale autonomous 
workshops to large-scale majoritarian consensus precisely because of these problems.  
9
 Schiller argues that grassroots participants in the Bolivarian Revolution understand the chavista state 
as “processual”, that is, “as a diffuse and unfolding ensemble of ideas, practices, individuals, and 
representations that has the potential to improve the lives of the poor and expand their access to 
meaningful participation in media production and broader politics” (2013: 541). 
